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How does banking market power affect bank opacity? Evidence from analysts’ 
forecasts 
 
Abstract: Whilst the ongoing banking regulatory reforms towards a comprehensive Basel III 
framework emphasise bank transparency, disclosure and a competitive banking market 
environment, very little is known about the empirical relationship between bank opacity and 
banking competition. We investigate the impact of competition, as measured by the 
individual bank’s pricing power in the banking market, on bank opacity using a large sample 
of US bank holding companies over the 1986-2015 period. We uncover new evidence, on 
the competition-bank opacity nexus, which suggests that banks with higher market 
power and operating in less competitive banking markets have lower analysts’ forecast 
errors and dispersions and may thus be less opaque. This effect is more pronounced for 
the 2007-09 global financial crisis period. Our evidence is robust to controlling for 
analysts’ characteristics, bank fixed-effects and endogeneity problems. 
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing banking regulatory reforms, especially the comprehensive Basel III framework, 
place major emphasis on disclosure, transparency and competition within the global banking 
sector.2 Indeed, interest in bank opacity and competition has arguably become more 
intense in recent years due to reasons which include the 2007-09 global financial crisis, 
the increasing complexity of banks’ business models and the dynamics of banks’ 
behaviour in response to changes in competitive pressures and regulations (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 1983, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Clinch and Verrecchia 1997; Zhao et 
al., 2013). In particular, the 2007-09 financial crisis was notably attributed to poor 
practices relating to lack of disclosure, transparency and fair competition among the 
major global banks. For instance, the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) scandal 
that only emerged recently has been identified as one of the major causes of the 2007-09 
financial crisis (Burton, 2018; Vaughan and Finch, 2017). In the main, it shows the 
extent to which senior bankers and traders of the major global banks colluded and 
connived to rig the LIBOR in their favour, in blatant disregard for banking and trading 
rules (Vaughan and Finch, 2017). This and many other opaque banking practices have 
recently been discovered, often resulting in criminal prosecutions, fines and long-term 
imprisonments (Burton, 2018; Vaughan and Finch, 2017). 
Consequently, the link among disclosure, transparency and competition within the 
banking system has received considerable attention from regulators, policy makers and 
practitioners (Anolli et al., 2014; Blau et al., 2017; Boubakri et al., 2015; Bushman et 
al., 2016). Observably, interest in issues of disclosure, transparency and competition 
partly stems from the fact that banks remain relatively more opaque than non-bank 
firms (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 2013; Blau et al., 2017). However, empirical 
studies examining the association between opacity and competition within the baking 
sector are rare (Blau et al., 2017; Fosu et al., 2017). The few existing studies also suffer 
from a number of observable limitations (e.g., Blau et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2016; Jones 
et al., 2012). For instance, Blau et al. (2017) examine how changes in competition 
                                                          
2Specifically, Basel III requires enhanced disclosures on the detail of the components of regulatory capital and 
their reconciliation to the reported accounts, including a comprehensive explanation of how a bank calculates 
its regulatory capital ratios. Please see the summary of the key aspects of the Basel framework, especially the 
market discipline component with the revised pillar 3 disclosure requirements, available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf [last accessed on 03 May 2018].  
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
4  
through regulatory reduction of entry barriers influenced the level and tone of voluntary 
disclosures, but failed to address the competition effect on the quality of information 
that banks release. Similarly, Jiang et al. (2016) investigated the impact of regulatory 
reforms that improved banking competition on bank opacity and found that greater 
competition reduces bank opacity. A major limitation of their analysis, however, is that 
their measures of bank opacity were restricted to information that is traditionally 
captured by the financial statements such as loan loss provisions. Thus, bank opacity 
emanating from other sources, such as the LIBOR scandal, is unlikely to be reflected in 
their empirical proxies for bank opacity. Of closer relevance to our study is Fosu et al. 
(2017), who utilised a much broader, market-based (analyst forecast) set of measures of 
bank opacity to analyse how competition and opacity impact bank stability. They, 
however, fell short of directly examining how competition affects bank opacity. 
Consequently, in this paper, we seek to contribute to the existing literature by providing 
new evidence on the relationship between competition and bank opacity by invoking the 
informativeness of analysts’ forecast properties (errors and dispersions) and employing a 
non-structural measure of competition that also directly reveals bank-level 
market/pricing power. By employing analysts’ forecast properties as our opacity measure, 
we avoid the limitations of the accounting-based measures such as susceptibility to 
manipulations by managers (Dichev et al., 2013), and being backward-looking (historical), 
and thus unable to fully reflect current and future asset opacity (Burks et al., 2017).  
Although private information is generally unavailable to a vast array of capital market 
participants, analysts can use their expertise to derive private information from public 
information, as well as use their special access to management to obtain privileged 
information (Keskek et al., 2017). As a result, analysts’ forecast properties such as earnings 
forecast errors and dispersions can arguably provide a more superior and direct estimate of 
bank opacity.  
We use ‘bank opacity’ as an encompassing term to refer to the inherent complexities 
and difficulties that impede the ability of outsiders (e.g., investors) to fully understand, 
evaluate and monitor the operations and assets of banks (e.g., Dewally and Shao, 2013; 
Flannery et al., 2013). The challenges to bank monitoring that are associated with 
opacity may emanate from reasons that include limited transparency and disclosures by 
banks, as well as the inherently risky nature of banking business. Since financial 
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analysts tend to be industry specialists, who serve as information intermediaries 
between firms and market participants (Boubakri et al., 2015; Keskek et al., 2017), we 
expect analysts of banks to possess an advantage in understanding the complex banking 
operations. However, if banks are indeed opaque, then, even expert bank analysts may 
struggle to make accurate predictions about banks’ earnings based on the existing public 
and private information available to them. Hence, we follow Fosu et al. (2017) by 
relying on the informativeness of analysts’ forecast errors and dispersions as our 
empirical gauge of the extent of bank opacity. Different from Fosu et al. (2017), 
however, we examine the potential drivers of bank opacity (specifically, the extent of 
banking competition, as inferred from bank-level pricing power), rather than its 
consequence on bank stability.  
Another important extension that we seek to make to the literature is to consider the role 
of financial crisis in shaping the competition-opacity nexus. This analysis is motivated 
by the view that monitoring incentives and information availability on financial firms, 
and thus bank opacity, may vary over time (i.e., in crisis vs. normal times) (e.g., 
Flannery et al., 2013; Simkovic, 2013). For example, Flannery et al. (2013) show that, 
while banks are not unusually more opaque than their non-bank peers in normal periods, 
they become significantly more opaque during crisis periods. Within the context of the 
competition effect on bank opacity, Simkovic (2013) contends that competition in the 
US mortgage securitsation market fuelled the recent financial crisis by undermining 
securitisers’ ability to monitor mortgage originators. This suggests that bank opacity 
may be considered to be a more serious problem in competitive markets during crisis 
periods. To the best of our knowledge and based on our extensive review of the 
literature, we are the first to explore the moderating role of financial crisis in the context 
of the competition-opacity literature. Jiang et al. (2016), Burks et al. (2017) and Fosu et 
al. (2017), which are the closest studies to the current paper, all fail to explore how the 
presence of crisis may moderate or accentuate the impact of competition on bank 
opacity.  
Our results, which are based on a large sample of 610 US bank holding companies over 
the 1986-2015 period, are as follows. We find that banks with greater market power, 
and hence operating in less competitive banking markets, are associated with lower 
bank opacity. In other words, the presence (absence) of intense competition in banking 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
6  
markets seems to increase (decrease) bank opacity. We further find this effect to persist 
over time, albeit it became more pronounced during the recent 2007-09 financial crisis. 
These results are robust to controlling for potential endogeneity problems that could 
arise from the simultaneity of bank opacity and competition. Further, our findings 
remain robust to controlling for analysts’ characteristics such as firm-specific and 
general industry experience or knowledge. Finally, our findings remain unchanged 
when we control for both unobserved firm- and state-quarter fixed-effects, as well as 
when we utilise a market-level measure of competition.  
In the process, we make several new contributions to the existing literature. First, we 
provide the first evidence of the effect of banking market competition on bank opacity 
derived from analysts’ forecast properties. Second, we depart from the existing 
literature on the opacity-competition nexus by employing a direct measure of 
competition at the bank level through individual bank’s market power, proxied by the 
Lerner Index, with marginal costs derived from a stochastic cost frontier rather than 
from accounting numbers in the financial statements. The Lerner index is commonly 
utilised in the banking literature as a proxy for competition in banking markets (e.g., Beck et 
al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014), but has not yet been applied to opacity. Finally, we 
disentangle the effect of the 2007-09 financial crisis on the relationship between 
competition and bank opacity by showing that banks behave differently during crisis 
periods, possibly due to the intense distress imposed by such crises (e.g., Flannery et al., 
2013; Blau et al., 2017). This underscores the need to highlight the moderating role of 
financial crises which has so far been ignored in the literature. 
The results of our study are of policy and practical relevance to policy makers, 
regulators, analysts, and other market participants. For instance, from a policy and 
regulatory perspective, our key finding implies that, with banking markets across the 
globe becoming increasingly competitive and innovative, there is the need to vigorously 
pursue moves to foster increased disclosure and transparency in banks if we are to 
achieve any meaningful market discipline. In this regard, our findings lend support to 
the Basel III regulatory framework that seeks to achieve higher levels of market 
discipline, disclosure and transparency by improving uniformity and full disclosure of 
banks’ capital base and leverage ratios.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
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literature. Section 3 discusses the empirical estimation methods, the data and variables used 
for the study. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, whilst Section 5 concludes 
2. Related literature  
In this section, we first explore the key reasons as to why banks may be associated with 
higher opacity. This helps to clarify the concept of bank opacity, as well as highlight the 
fundamental channels through which banking market competition could potentially impact 
bank opacity. We also review the literature on the linkage between opacity and competition 
and derive our hypothesis.  
2.1 Why are banks opaque? 
Although opacity of balance sheets is a common corporate feature across all industries, 
banks are generally regarded to be more opaque than other types of firms (e.g., Morgan, 
2002; Flannery et al., 2013; Blau et al., 2017). For instance, Flannery et al. (2013) assess 
the relative opaqueness of banking firms and observe some evidence that suggests that banks 
are unusually more opaque than a sample of matched non-banking firms, particularly during 
crisis periods. Similarly, Blau et al. (2017) document that banks exhibit significant stock 
price delays/inefficiencies relative to matched non-bank firms, suggesting that stock 
investors are either less informed about bank assets or, perhaps, struggle to fully 
comprehend banking operations.  
Early research by Morgan (2002) attributes the opacity of the financial sector to the 
specialty of bank assets and the high leverage that banks employ. He notes that banks’ 
assets (loans and trading assets, in particular) have risks that are hard to observe, but 
easy to change, resulting in a higher uncertainty over banks. Moreover, the presence of 
high leverage in banks invites agency problems, thereby compounding the uncertainty 
over banks’ assets. Relating opacity to agency problems (specifically, managerial 
misbehaviour), Beatty et al. (2002) argue that managers’ incentives to extract private rent 
can cause them to engage in earnings management and, in the process, increase banks’ 
opacity. They further offer empirical evidence to suggest that banks engage in earnings 
management either to reduce their tax liabilities or to circumvent regulations on capital 
requirements. 
Later studies have also attempted to relate financial innovations to bank opacity. In 
Wagner’s (2007) theoretical model in which managers have the incentive to avoid market 
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discipline, managers use complex financial instruments such as derivatives to make their 
activities more difficult to monitor. Consistent with the prediction of this model, Dewally 
and Shao (2013) find that financial derivatives (specifically, interest rate and foreign 
exchange derivatives) diminish the transparency of large US bank holding companies’ 
balance sheets, thereby making them more opaque. Overall, it seems that the relatively 
higher degree of opacity in banks stems from three main sources: (i) the inherently greater 
risks associated with their balance sheets, particularly their assets; (ii) the higher risk of 
financial statement manipulation by bank managers, perhaps to circumvent regulatory 
requirements; and (iii) the complexity of financial innovations, possibly to frustrate market 
discipline.  
Whatever the cause of opacity in the banking sector, there is virtually no disagreement 
regarding its potential devastating effects on the financial system. Fosu et al. (2017) 
document that opacity increases insolvency risks among banks. Beyond the effect on 
individual banks, Jones et al. (2012) suggest that opacity has the potential to threaten the 
entire banking system because it may cause price contagion in the market which may lead to 
financial instability and systemic risk. Further, Dewally and Shao (2013) note that, when 
banks are unusually opaque, market-based discipline may fail as market participants are not 
able to monitor and discipline banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Arguably, the far-reaching 
consequences of bank opacity provide a justification for tighter regulation of banks. 
However, the banking sector in most advanced economies, particularly the US, has 
increasingly been deregulated (Jiang et al., 2016; Burks et al., 2017), with implications for 
competition and opacity in banks. We, therefore, turn our attention to the literature on the 
relationship between competition and opacity to further explore this matter.     
2.2 Competition and bank opacity 
To the extent that competition in the banking market may influence factors such as the 
nature of assets that banks choose to hold, and managerial incentives to manipulate 
financial statements, as well as encourage banks to develop complex financial 
innovations, it is plausible to expect competition (or market power) to be related to bank 
opacity. Surprisingly, studies on this topic have focused largely on non-bank firms, with 
mixed conclusions (e.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh, 2013; Markarian and Santalo, 
2014; Balakrishnan and Cohen, 2013). Although the literature thus far lacks a clear 
prediction or conclusion on the effect of competition on firm opacity, it at least points to 
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potential channels through which competition (or individual firm’s market power) may 
increase or decrease bank opacity. Competition can impact on bank opacity mainly 
through two broad channels: (i) the earnings management and disclosure channel; and 
(ii) the innovation channel. 
The often-cited channels through which competition impacts opacity are the risk of 
financial statement manipulation and/or the willingness (or the lack of it) to disclose 
quality information about the firm to outside stakeholders. Theoretically, competition 
can improve internal corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), as well as serve 
as a mechanism for exercising external discipline on management (Nickell, 1996), and 
thereby reducing discretionary earnings management and improving information 
disclosure (Leuz et al., 2003). Also, by facilitating market entry, competition can foster 
effective peer benchmarking, which can help in extracting or verifying information 
about individual banks within the industry (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Holmstrom, 
1982; Dichev et al., 2013). Furthermore, Darrough and Stoughton’s (1990) model of an 
entry game suggests that greater competition from potential entrants in an industry leads 
to greater disclosure by incumbent firms, since the disclosure of ‘bad news’ by the 
incumbent can deter potential entrants to the market, whilst the disclosure of positive 
information would reduce the incumbent firm’s cost of capital. Similarly, Wagenhofer 
(1990) suggests that increased competition can lead to full information disclosure. 
Overall, the above theoretical arguments suggest less (more) opacity for banks in 
competitive (concentrated) markets since competition can reduce earnings management 
and also improve quality information disclosure. Some existing empirical studies 
provide evidence to support this position. Balakrishnan and Cohen (2013) find that 
concentrated (i.e., less competitive) industries tend to have more financial restatements. The 
authors further show that industries experiencing tariff reductions through exposure to 
greater foreign competition tend to have fewer restatements. Jiang et al. (2016) relate a 
deregulation-induced measure of competition to two bank opacity measures (abnormal 
accrual of loan loss provisions and the frequency of financial statement restatements). They 
find that intensification of competition following deregulation reduces abnormal accruals of 
loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate their financial statements. 
They conclude that competition reduces bank opacity by potentially enhancing the ability of 
markets to monitor banks.   
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By contrast, another strand of the literature suggests that competition rather increases 
opacity by heightening managerial incentives to manipulate financial statements or to 
withhold quality information from outsiders. Shleifer (2004) argues that intense banking 
competition could lead to higher uncertainty due to the greater risk of unethical 
behaviour, including aggressive earnings manipulations, among managers. Datta et al. 
(2011) contend that, unlike concentrated industries, where individual firms may have 
some pricing power, firms in competitive markets have limited pricing power and, thus, 
a reduced ability to maintain profit margins and absorb exogenous shocks to cost. 
Consequently, the increased competitive pressure increases the risk of financial 
statement manipulation, presumably to conceal poor or unfavourable financial results, 
which can consequently result in higher opacity in competitive markets. Further, greater 
competition may increase takeover threats (Jones et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2016), causing 
job insecurity and, therefore, making managers more inclined to manipulate earnings 
(Armstrong et al., 2012). On information disclosure by competing firms, Verrecchia 
(1983) and Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) suggest that firms in industries characterised 
by intense product market competition tend to disclose less information because the 
disclosure of more (private) information gives competitors a strategic competitive 
advantage.  
Consistent with the theoretical predictions of the above-mentioned strand of literature, a 
few scholars (e.g., Bushman et al., 2016; Markarian and Santalo, 2014) report findings 
that suggest higher (lower) levels of opacity for firms in more competitive 
(concentrated) markets. For example, using the Lerner and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
(HHI) indexes to gauge the cross-industry variations in competition, Markarian and 
Santalo (2014) and Datta et al. (2013) find that competition increases earnings 
management. Bushman et al. (2016) use a textual analysis of banks’ 10-K filings to 
measure the competitive pressures facing banks and find that banks delay the 
recognition of expected loan losses when they face stronger competition.  
The foregoing discussion points to an ambiguous relationship between competition and 
bank opacity. We, therefore, next turn to the innovation channel of the relationship to 
streamline our testable hypothesis. The innovation channel suggests that competition 
compels firms to be innovative, and thereby making it difficult to accurately assess the 
quality of their assets. In fact, as Hou and Robinson (2006) highlight, the very need for 
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survival requires firms in competitive industries to innovate. Meanwhile, innovative 
firms are associated with greater technological discontinuities (i.e., sudden and dramatic 
changes in the use of a certain technology) and high information complexity, making it 
more difficult to assess their earnings. Datta et al. (2011) point out that the information 
complexity associated with innovative firms arises from the difficulty in quantifying 
potential success of innovations as well as the deeply complex task of projecting 
counter responses of rival firms. Interestingly, empirical studies generally find a 
positive relation between innovative activities and product market competition (e.g., 
Nickell, 1996; Nerkar and Shane, 2003). For instance, Nerkar and Shane (2003) show 
that industry concentration inhibits the exploitation of new innovations because such 
innovations have no compelling strategic survival advantages. To the extent that 
innovation increases uncertainty about asset quality, this evidence implies that firms in 
concentrated and, possibly, less competitive markets are less opaque. 
Collectively, whilst the earnings management and information disclosure channels offer 
ambiguous conclusions on the effect of competition (or market power) on firms’ 
opacity, the innovation channel seems to offer an unequivocal positive (negative) 
relationship between competition (market power) and firms’ opacity. Therefore, the 
crucial role of financial innovations in the banking sector (e.g., Wagner, 2007; Dewally 
and Shao, 2013) suggests that competition in banking is more likely than not to increase 
bank opacity. This leads us to hypothesise that the extent of competition (market power) 
in the banking market should be positively (negatively) related to bank opacity.    
We test the above hypothesis in ways that differ from the above strands of literature, and 
thus allowing us to further extend our understanding of the competition-opacity nexus. 
First, whilst the existing literature focuses mainly on accounting measures of opacity, 
we measure opacity through analysts’ forecast properties. As previously noted, 
accounting measures are unable to fully reflect the extent of bank opacity because they 
are: (i) historical in orientation; and (ii) subject to managerial manipulations (Burks et 
al., 2017; Dichev et al., 2013). In contrast, analysts’ forecast properties (errors and 
dispersions) offer a more direct and superior measure of opacity, as they reflect past, 
current and future opacity levels by drawing on both publicly and privately available 
information (Keskek et al., 2017; Ye and Yu, 2017).  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
12  
By their nature, analysts are important participants in capital markets. They are efficient 
intermediaries between banks and investors, processing public information efficiently 
to derive private information useful for market discipline. Further, they provide 
effective monitoring of banks (Mansi et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 2015), regularly 
revising forecasts throughout the year as they update their private information. In fact, 
the empirical literature suggests that analysts’ forecast properties have a first-order 
causality effect on market liquidity (Roulstone, 2003; Boubakri et al. 2015). For instance, 
Roulstone (2003) finds that analysts’ forecast dispersion increases the bid-ask spread 
and its adverse selection component. Similarly, Mansi et al. (2011) and Boubakri et al. 
(2015) show that analysts’ forecast inaccuracies and dispersions are significantly 
associated with higher credit spreads. Collectively, these studies suggest that analysts’ 
forecast properties (errors and dispersions) may represent a superior measure of 
opacity with specific reference to broader market discipline. Consequently, our reliance 
on market-based analysts forecast properties to derive a superior proxy for opacity 
represents an important contribution to the literature, which may help to resolve the 
ambiguities in the market structure-bank opacity literature.  
Specifically, the errors in the earnings forecasts of analysts, as well as the 
disagreements among analysts (dispersion of forecasts) that follow a bank, may be 
strong indicators of opacity. Our approach and rationale in proxying bank opacity is akin 
to that adopted by Morgan (2002) and Fosu et al. (2017). While Morgan (2002) relies on 
the disagreements between specialist bond rating agencies (Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s) as a measure of opacity in banks and insurance companies, Fosu et al. (2017) 
utilise analyst forecast errors and disagreements among analysts in their forecasts of 
banks’ earnings to measure bank opacity.   
Second, we employ a direct measure of competition at the bank level, the Lerner index. Our 
measure is more intuitive and popular in the banking literature (see Beck et al., 2013; 
Anginer et al., 2014), as it is more capable of capturing competition arising from the 
interactions amongst existing banks and new entrants. Unlike other structural measures of 
competition, such as concentration indices and market share, the Lerner index does not 
require a precise geographic definition of banking markets (Aghion et al., 2005). This 
unique feature of the Lerner index is particularly important as banks become increasingly 
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diversified and banking markets become increasingly deregulated, with geographic 
boundaries between them gradually becoming faint. Further, the Lerner index provides a 
measure of bank pricing power on both assets and funding cost and reflects the banks’ 
franchise value (Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014) upon which the theoretical argument 
for the competition-opacity relationship partly depends (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). Thus, the 
Lerner index which we employ in our study has a sound economic basis and an intuitive 
appeal to capture salient features of competition different from those used in other 
existing studies.  
In summary, the academic debate on the relationship between competition and opacity in 
the banking literature remains largely inconclusive, necessitating further research. We 
contribute to resolving this puzzle by proposing analyst forecast properties as an 
alternative measure of opacity in banking in conjunction with an intuitively appealing 
non-structural measure of competition (i.e., the Lerner index).  
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1 Data description 
We obtain consolidated balance sheet and income statement from FR Y-9C quarterly reports 
filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. In addition to this dataset, we obtain the 
market data for bank holding companies from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. Further, we obtain analysts’ forecast and actual earnings per share data 
from the Detail History file of the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We link 
the consolidated balance sheet and income statement with the market data using the CRSP-
FRB link table from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We then link the resulting 
dataset with the analysts’ earnings forecast data. For consistency, we follow Jones et al. 
(2012) and present all balance sheet items as end of quarter amounts, whilst income 
statement variables are annualised quarterly amounts. 
Following the existing literature (e.g., Fosu, 2014; Haw et al., 2015), we apply a few 
exclusion criteria. These include banks with missing values for the main variables. We also 
exclude banks with negative stock price. Finally, bank holding companies with fewer than 
three consecutive quarters of data are also excluded. We finally ended up with an 
unbalanced panel of 610 bank holding companies over the 1986-2015 period. 
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3.2 Estimation method 
In this section, we model the empirical relationship between bank opacity and competition. 
We follow the existing literature (e.g., Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2016) 
and control for a number of bank-level factors and analysts’ characteristics. Specifically, we 
employ the following econometric framework: 
                    , , 1 , , 1 , 1
1
K
i t i t k k i t i t
k
Opacity Competition X     

                               (1) 
where Opacity, Competition and X are proxies for bank opacity, banking market competition 
and other control variables, respectively, all of which are as defined in Section 3.3;  ,   
and  are parameters; the subscript i and t  indicate the thi bank and the tht time period; 
and k indices the thk control variable.   is a composite error term made up of bank-specific 
fixed-effects ( i ) and an independent and identically distributed component ( ti, ). 
As indicated in Section 1, we take the view that banks behave differently during crisis 
periods than in normal times, as crisis can heighten industry-wide distress, availability of 
information and incentives to monitor banks (Flannery et al., 2013; Simkovic, 2013). To take 
account of this difference in bank behaviour over time, we extend Equation (1) to include a 
crisis dummy variable, taking the value of 1 for the period 2007-2009, representing the 
recent financial crisis, and 0 otherwise. We thus obtain Eq. (2) as follows: 
       , , 1 , , 1 , 1 , 1
1
K
i t i t k k i t i t t i t
k
Opacity Competition X Competition Crisis        

        (2) 
where Crisisis a dummy variable representing the 2007-2009 financial crisis; and   and   
are parameters. We also compare the potential impact of the pre-crisis period on bank 
opacity by replacing the crisis dummy in Eq. (2) with a pre-crisis dummy taking the value of 1 
for the years prior to the 2007-09 crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
Eqs. (1) and (2) can be estimated using OLS; however, this approach could lead to biased 
and inconsistent estimates due to the correlation of the firm fixed-effects with the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 465). Hence, we estimate these models using 
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the panel fixed-effects approach and use pooled OLS only for robustness check. We control 
for time fixed-effects by including time dummies in all estimations. Finally, we adjust the 
standard error using the Huber-White approach and clustering at the firm level. 
3.3 Measurements of variables 
3.3.1. Competition 
The banking literature typically measures competition using the Lerner index, Panzar-Ross 
H-statistics, Boone indicator and structural measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Amongst these measures, however, the Lerner index is the only measure of 
competition that varies at the bank level, whilst the remaining measures are best suited for 
measuring cross-country differences in competition. This perhaps explains why the Lerner 
index is a popular measure of competition in the banking literature. For instance, Beck et al. 
(2013) employ the index to investigate whether competition affects bank stability, whereas 
Anginer et al. (2014) rely on it to explore the link between competition and bank systemic 
risks. 
Since we are particularly interested in individual banks’ changes in opacity in response to 
variations in competition, we follow past studies (Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014; 
Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015) to infer the extent of banking market competition from 
the Lerner index – a firm-level measure of competitiveness or market/pricing power. We 
rely on the classical economic theory that firms in a perfectly competitive market will be 
price takers and not have much control of prices and profitability (e.g., Mankiw and 
Whinston, 1986). By contrast, in less competitive markets, individual firms may exercise 
some control over pricing/profitability, and thus enjoy some level of market power and 
competitive advantage.  
The Lerner index measures the degree of market power exercised by banks, which is proxied 
by the extent to which banks can charge a higher price above marginal cost. Thus, higher 
values of the index indicate greater market power, and by extension lower levels of 
competition in a market, and vice versa. In sum, the Lerner index is a direct measure of 
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banking market power, and, arguably, an indirect measure of banking market competition.3 
The Lerner index is computed as follows: 
ti
titi
ti
P
MCP
Lerner
,
,,
,

                      (3) 
where Pit, refers to price of total assets of bank i at time t, proxied by the ratio of total 
revenue to total assets; and MCi,t refers to the marginal cost of bank i at time t. We cannot 
directly observe marginal cost; hence, we follow the extant literature (e.g., Fernández et al., 
2013; Beck et al., 2013) and derive it from a translog cost function (TCF) as in Eq. (6) below: 
3 3 3
2
, 1 , 2 , , , , , , , ,
1 1 1
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             ln ln
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    
  
  

    
  
 

               (4)
  
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 refers to the total cost of bank i at time t; 𝑄𝑖𝑡 refers to output, proxied by total 
assets of bank i at time t; and 𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 is input prices of labour (k=1), capital (k=2) and funding 
(k=3) for bank i at time t. We apply symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in input 
prices by scaling the total cost (C) and the price of inputs by the input price of funds. The 
marginal costs are obtained from Eq. (7) as indicated below: 






 

tikk
k
ti
ti
ti
ti WQ
Q
C
MC ,,
3
1
,21
,
,
, lnln                               (5) 
3.3.2 Opacity  
As noted earlier, prior literature on the competition-opacity nexus in banking employs 
mainly accounting measures of bank opacity (e.g., Bushman et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2017). 
However, these measures are limited because they are backward looking and fail to 
incorporate market perspective; and, as a result, they make it difficult to gauge the extent of 
market discipline (Burks et al., 2017; Dichev et al., 2013). Hence, following Flannery (2004), 
                                                          
3We also construct a market-level Lerner index to replace our firm-level index in new sets of regressions 
reported later, in Section 4.4 (see Table 11). Our conclusions remain robust to this market-level proxy for 
competition. 
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Ergungor et al. (2015) and Fosu et al. (2017), we derive our measures of opacity mainly from 
analysts’ forecast properties, namely, analyst forecast error, analyst forecast dispersion and 
opacity score. Our approach broadly relies on the intuition in Morgan (2002) and Fosu et 
al. (2017) which suggests that disagreements among expert analysts and rating agencies 
may capture the extent of bank opacity. Before we proceed to derive these measures, 
we ensure that only the most recent earnings forecast for every analyst who provides 
more than one forecast is used. Additionally, we adjust earnings forecast using the CRSP 
cumulative adjustment factor to ensure that actual and forecast earnings per share are 
based on the same number of shares outstanding (Robinson and Glushkov, 2006).  
We measure analysts’ forecast error as the absolute value of the difference between 
mean analysts’ forecasts and actual earnings per share scaled by the share price at the 
beginning of the fiscal quarter. Specifically, we compute analysts’ forecast error as 
below:  
, ,
,
, 1
 
Pr
i t i t
i t
i t
FEPS AEPS
Forecast errror
ice 

                    (6) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the average of all earnings forecasts for bank i in fiscal quarter t; 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is 
the actual earnings per share for bank i in fiscal quarter t; and Pricei,t-1 is the share price of 
bank i at the beginning of fiscal quarter t.  
Our second measure of opacity, the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, is measured as 
the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for the fiscal quarter scaled by the share price 
at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. We construct our third measure of opacity, opacity 
score, such that we exploit the informativeness of both forecast error and forecast 
dispersion. Specifically, we first follow Clement and Tse (2005) and Kim et al. (2011) by 
applying a transformation that preserves the relative distance of both forecast errors and 
forecast dispersion as follows: 
, ,
,
, ,
(  ) (  )
_E
(  ) (  )
i t i t
i t
i t i t
Forecast error Min Forecast error
Norm rror
Max Forecast error Min Forecast error
 
  
  
               (7)
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DispersionNorm     (8)
  
The transformed variables range from 0 to 1. We then develop Opacity Score as the sum of 
the transformed forecast error ( _E )Norm rror  and the transformed forecast dispersion 
( _ )Norm Dispersion : 
DispersionNormrrorNormScoreOpacity _E__                                           (9) 
3.3.3 Control variables 
To gauge the relationship between competition and opacity, we follow the existing 
literature (e.g., Li, 2010; Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015; Huyghebaert and Xu, 2016) and 
control for several variables in our econometric models. We include bank size (Size, the 
natural logarithm of each bank’s total assets) to account for the possibility that large banks 
have more stable earnings and do disclose more information (Huyghebaert and Xu, 2016). 
Larger banks may also be followed by a larger number of analysts, which subsequently 
impacts forecast accuracy (Ye and Yu, 2017). Hence, we also account for the number of 
analysts (Analyst) following each bank in each quarter.  
We acknowledge that each of these analysts may have differing levels of general forecast 
experience (Experience) and firm-specific experience (Length), measured as the average 
number of days since the analysts first forecast for any firm or for the covered firm, 
respectively (Clement, 1999; Ergungor et al., 2015). Further, each following analyst may 
have a different breadth of coverage, which may influence their forecast accuracy; hence, 
we include the number of firms followed by each covered analyst in each quarter, Scope 
(Ergungor et al., 2015). The marginal benefits of analyst’s experience and breadth of 
coverage may diminish over time; hence, we express these variables as 1 plus their natural 
logarithm.  
Moreover, we account for bank business model by including variables capturing funding and 
income structure. Bank funding structure is the proportion of core deposits to total liabilities 
(Deposits), whilst income structure is the proportion of non-interest income to total income 
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(Non-interest). Banks with core deposits have stable funding (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011), 
but they are subject to less stringent monitoring (Calomiris, 1999). Banks with higher non-
interest income could be complex, making their earnings difficult to forecast (Thomas, 
2002). 
Additionally, we control for bank capital (Capital), the ratio of book value of equity to total 
assets, as a bank’s level of capitalisation is associated with its level of stability or risk-taking, 
with consequences for its level of opacity. Also, more volatile earnings make bank assets 
difficult to value; hence, we control for earnings volatility (Volatility) as in Datta et al. (2011) 
and Haw et al. (2015). We measure Volatility as the annual standard deviation of return on 
equity. Likewise, we control for earnings surprise (Surprise), defined as the absolute 
difference between current and prior quarter earnings per share (Haw et al., 2015). Finally, 
we include the ratio of bank loans to total assets (Loans) and loan loss provisions to total 
assets (Provisions) to capture banks’ lending specialisation and credit risk, respectively. 
Table 1 presents a detailed list and definitions of all variables used. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
3.4. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
In Table 2, we present the descriptive statistics of the variables for our empirical analysis. 
We report our three measures of opacity: (i) analyst forecast error, (ii) analyst forecast 
dispersion and (iii) opacity score. The mean values of these measures are 0.44, 0.20 and 
0.26, respectively. These variables also have a standard deviation of 0.90, 0.37 and 0.36, 
respectively. This implies that, among these three measures, analyst forecast error has the 
highest mean value and degree of variability. In general, our measures of opacity exhibit 
high levels of variability. Further, the mean value of our competition variable (Lerner) is 0.64 
with a standard deviation of 0.16. This variable rises from a minimum of 0.35 to a maximum 
of 0.87, suggesting a high degree of heterogeneity across the banks investigated.   
With respect to the control variables, a few findings are worth noting. First, we observe that 
the mean value of Size is 15.55 with a standard deviation of 1.47. This variable has a 
minimum and maximum value of 13.45 and 18.70, respectively, signifying a fair degree of 
heterogeneity. Also, the average value of the number of analysts following is 6.33, with a 
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standard deviation of 6.22. It also has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 39, 
suggesting high levels of heterogeneity in the number of analysts following the sample banks. 
The mean value of general experience (Experience) is 7.60 with a standard deviation of 0.87, 
a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 9.22, thus exhibiting a high level of 
heterogeneity. We also note that Length and Scope have mean values of 6.28 and 2.77, 
respectively. These variables have standard deviations of 1.54 and 0.34 and minimum 
(maximum) values of 0.00 (8.71) and 0.69 (4.93), respectively. These figures show a 
moderate degree of variability and a high degree of heterogeneity in the characteristics of 
analysts following the banks investigated.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Turning our attention to Table 3, we present the correlation between the variables used in our 
study. We first note that the correlations between our measures of opacity (i.e., analyst 
forecast error, analyst forecast dispersion and opacity score) are very high. This suggests that 
all the three dependent variables are capturing similar information (i.e., opacity). A 
preliminary insight into the relationship between opacity and competition (Lerner) is also 
illustrated by the correlation matrix. We observe that the correlation (but not necessarily 
causal relationship) between our measures of opacity (i.e., analyst forecast error, analyst 
forecast dispersion and opacity score) and Lerner is negative.  
In general, the evidence emerging from the correlation matrix, as well as the descriptive 
statistics, suggests that our sample does not seem to suffer from serious issues such as limited 
variation and heterogeneity or large outliers. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this study, we set out to investigate the banking competition-opacity relationship by using 
three different but related measures of opacity. We observe a slight variation in the sample 
size depending on the choice of dependent variables; that is, (i) analyst forecast error, (ii) 
analyst forecast dispersion or (iii) opacity score. In the sections that follow, we look at the 
impact of banking competition on each of these measures of opacity.  
4.1 Banking competition and bank opacity – analysts' forecast error 
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In Table 4, we present the empirical results of Eq. (1) by testing the effect of competition on 
bank opacity derived from analysts' forecast error. Models 1 to 5 are based on OLS 
estimation and 6 to 10 present panel fixed-effects estimation.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We start our discussion with Models 1 and 6 where bank opacity is explained by competition 
(Lerner index) only. In both models, the coefficient on Lerner index is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that greater banking market power reduces 
bank opacity. This implies that intense competition in banking markets may increase bank 
opacity. We extend Models 1 and 6 by including control variables for bank size, lending 
specialisation, the level of capitalisation, earnings surprise, loan loss provisions, volatility of 
returns on equity and analysts following in Models 2 and 7. We further control for bank 
business model, proxied by the ratio of non-interest income to total income and the ratio of 
core deposits to total deposits alternatively in Models 3-4 and Models 8-9, and jointly in 
Models 5 and 10. The coefficient on Lerner index remains negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level throughout all specifications, supporting the negative (positive) 
relationship between market power (competition) and opacity. The economic impact of 
banking market power is also very large. Based on our fully specified models, a one standard 
deviation increase in the Lerner index is associated with a 14.81–17.23 basis point decrease 
in analysts’ forecast error, our measure of opacity. This represents 33.55%–39.05% of the 
mean bank opacity. Overall, our finding suggests that, in a competitive banking environment, 
banks are less likely to disclose sensitive information, to prevent rivals from capitalising on 
the information (Verrecchia, 1983).  
Although our finding is in stark contrast to Jiang et al. (2016), we exercise a fair amount of 
caution in our comparison, as our measures of opacity and competition differ from theirs. Our 
results, however, support the evidence in Bushman, Hendricks and Williams (2016) showing 
that greater competition is associated with higher opacity, as measured by less timely loan 
loss recognitions. Our finding suggests that the recent Basel III regulatory framework, which 
promotes market discipline through bank transparency, could yield more benefits in countries 
with a relatively higher degree of banking market competition.  
With respect to the control variables, notable observations are that larger firms have larger 
analysts’ forecast errors. This finding suggests that larger banks are more opaque than their 
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smaller counterpart banks, and it is consistent with the evidence that larger banks exercise 
more discretion on loan loss provisions (Jiang et al., 2016) and on asset valuation (Huizinga 
and Laeven, 2012). This finding is also consistent with the evidence for non-financial firms, 
suggesting that larger firms have larger analysts’ forecast errors (Datta et al., 2011; Haw et 
al., 2015). Also, banks with large outstanding loans, and hence higher lending specialisation, 
have higher forecast errors. Similarly, banks with a larger share of loan loss provisions, 
signifying exposure to credit risk, exhibit larger forecast errors. Moreover, in line with Anolli 
et al. (2014), Datta et al. (2011) and Haw et al. (2015), we find that volatility of return on 
equity increases forecast errors. Banks with higher earnings surprise have larger forecast 
errors, whilst banks followed by a larger number of analysts have lower analysts’ forecast 
errors. These findings are also largely consistent with the evidence for non-financial firms 
(e.g., Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015). Further, non-interest income capturing earnings 
diversification is positively associated with forecast errors. This finding is consistent with the 
view that income diversification makes earnings less predictable (Thomas, 2002). Finally, 
dependence on core deposit funding is positively associated with analysts’ forecast errors. 
This finding is consistent with the view that deposit funding is associated with less 
monitoring (Calomiris, 1999). In contrast, banks with higher levels of capital have lower 
forecast error. 
4.2 Banking competition and bank opacity – other related measures of opacity 
In this section, we demonstrate that our results are robust to using other analyst forecast-
related measures of opacity. First, we follow Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and 
Fosu et al. (2016) and employ analysts’ forecast dispersion as our measure of opacity. 
Forecast dispersion captures the disagreement amongst analysts that follow a bank 
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999); hence, it represents a good measure of opacity. We 
present the results in Table 5. As before, we follow the sequential approach where we first 
model forecast dispersion as a function of competition (Models 1 and 5) only and extend the 
model to include bank-specific control variables (Models 2 and 6) as well as the bank 
business model variables (Models 3-5 and 8-10). The results show that the coefficient on 
Lerner index is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The impact of Lerner 
index on analysts’ forecast dispersion is also economically significant – a one standard 
deviation increase in the Lerner index is associated with a 29.97%–32.08% decrease in the 
mean forecast dispersion of the average bank. This finding suggests that banking market 
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power (competition) significantly decreases (increases) bank opacity, which is in line with 
our earlier results. 
The coefficients on the control variables are also consistently signed. Larger banks have 
higher forecast dispersion, as they are banks with higher levels of lending specialisation, 
earnings surprise, loan loss provisions, volatility of returns and non-interest income. In 
contrast, and consistent with the previous results, banks with higher levels of capital have 
lower forecast dispersion. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second, we develop a measure of opacity that is based on the normalised values of analysts’ 
forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Specifically, we normalise both analysts’ forecast 
errors and forecast dispersion so that each of them ranges between 0 and 1. We then sum up 
the normalised values of these variables and derive our third measure of opacity, Opacity 
Score. In Table 6, we present the estimation results based on this measure of opacity. We 
note that the coefficient on Opacity Score is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level across all models, suggesting that banking market power (competition) increases bank 
opacity. The impact of market power (competition) is also noteworthy – a one standard 
deviation increase in competition is associated with a 29.97%–35.34% decrease (increase) in 
bank opacity. On the control variables, we find that bank size, lending specialisation, 
earnings surprise, provisions for loan losses, volatility of returns on equity and non-interest 
income increase bank opacity, whilst higher levels of bank capital decrease bank opacity.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Overall, the results obtained from using alternative measures of bank opacity suggest that 
intense banking competition increases bank opacity; the effect is both statistically significant 
and economically significant. 
4.3 Banking competition and bank opacity – addressing potential endogeneity 
We acknowledge the concern that bank opacity and the levels of banking competition may be 
simultaneously determined, leading to potential endogeneity issues, which can bias our 
findings. This issue is of less concern since we lag our independent variables. In this section, 
however, we take extra steps to address the potential endogeneity issues and show that our 
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findings remain robust. 
We re-estimate our main models using a two-stage estimation approach. We employ bank 
inefficiency, measured as the ratio of bank overheads to income (i.e., cost-income ratio), and 
the second lag of the Lerner index as instruments for the Lerner index. Hence, in the first 
stage, we model the Lerner index, as a function of its second lag, of cost-income ratio, and all 
the other exogenous variables. In the second stage, we model our measures of bank opacity 
(forecast error, forecast dispersion and opacity scores) alternately, as a function of the 
predicted values of the Lerner index, derived from the first-stage regressions, and all the other 
control variables. We present the results in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In Models 1, 3 and 5 of Table 6, we present the results of the first-stage regression. The 
coefficient on cost-income ratio and the lagged Lerner index are positive and significant at 
the 1% level across all the models. This suggests that the instruments are relevant. The 
diagnostic tests presented also confirm the relevance and validity of the instruments.4 In 
Models 2, 4 and 6, we present the second-stage regression results. The coefficient on the 
Lerner index remains negative and significant across these models. The results corroborate 
our earlier finding suggesting that a higher degree of market power (intense banking 
competition) decreases (increases) bank opacity. Overall, the results suggest that the findings 
are not plagued by endogeneity problems. 
4.4. Other robustness checks and further analysis 
In this section, we present the results of a battery of robustness tests by: (i) controlling for 
analyst characteristics; (ii) disentangling the effect of crisis; (iii) using state-quarter mean-
adjusted measure of competition; and (iv) utilising a market-level competition measure. We 
present the results in Tables 8-11. In all cases, we confirm our results suggesting that banking 
market power (competition) decreases (increases) bank opacity. 
First, the analyst forecast literature suggests that analysts’ experience gained by covering a 
particular bank (firm-specific experience) or several banks (general experience) over time 
                                                          
4The Hansen J-statistics p-values are all in excess of 0.1. This suggests that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid (e.g., Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). Also, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, compared with 
the Stock-Yogo IV critical values, rules out weak instrument problems; they are all larger than the rule-of-
thumb minimum of 10 (Baum, 2006). 
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impacts their forecast ability (e.g., Clement, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997; 
Ergungor et al., 2008). To this end, we re-estimate our models again by controlling for 
analysts’ firm-specific experience, general level of experience and scope of coverage, 
alternately and jointly. We present the results in Table 8. The coefficient on the Lerner index 
remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level across all models in Table 8, 
confirming our main finding that banking market power (competition) decreases (increases) 
bank opacity. The importance of analysts’ experience is, however, mixed: analysts’ general 
experience is negatively and significantly related to all of our opacity measures, but the scope 
of analysts’ coverage seems to reduce forecast error only when we do not control for 
analysts’ bank-specific and general level of experience. Contrary to our expectations, we find 
that the bank-specific experience seems to increase opacity derived from forecast error and 
opacity score.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Second, we address the concern that our finding may be plagued by the confounding effect of 
the recent financial crisis. Our sample period covers the 2007-09 financial crisis. The crisis 
could affect analysts’ optimism and pessimism, as it increases industry-wide distress 
(Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Flannery et al., 2013). Moreover, the crisis could affect banks’ 
incentives to release accurate information about themselves (Flannery et al., 2013), as well 
as the incentives of key stakeholders in competitive markets to monitor banks (Simkovic, 
2013). Thus, the impact of competition on bank opacity may vary across normal and crisis 
periods. To examine this issue, we include dummy variables for the pre-crisis (1986-2006) 
and acute crisis (2007-2009) periods in our regression. The post-crisis period (2010-2015) 
effectively becomes the reference period. This approach permits us to observe whether the 
crisis sub-periods shift the regression line. Further, we include the interaction terms between 
these dummy variables and the Lerner index, thus permitting us to assess the moderating role 
of the crisis on the opacity-competition nexus.  
In Models 1-3 of Table 9, we present the results where forecast error is our measure of 
opacity. The coefficient on the Lerner index remains negative and significant. The coefficient 
on the interaction term between the Lerner index and pre-crisis dummy variable is, however, 
positive across all models, suggesting that competition decreases bank opacity, albeit by a 
lower margin in the period prior to financial crisis. However, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the Lerner index and the crisis dummy variables is negative and 
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statistically significant, suggesting that competition increases bank opacity by a larger margin 
during a crisis period. We obtain qualitatively similar results in Models 4-6 and Models 7-9 
where forecast dispersion and opacity score are used, respectively, as the measure of opacity. 
These results are generally in line with the view that banks become more opaque during a 
crisis period than in normal periods (e.g., Flannery et al., 2013). 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Third, we address the concern that the bank-level competition measure that we use may be 
driven by state-specific attributes, such as regulatory and institutional differences, that may 
bias the opacity-competition nexus. We address this concern in two main ways. Firstly, we 
adjust our competition measure by subtracting from the bank-level measure of competition 
the state-mean competition, thereby arriving at a state-quarter mean-adjusted measure of 
competition. Similarly, we adjust our measures of opacity and obtain state-quarter mean-
adjusted opacity. We then re-estimate our models using these state-quarter mean-adjusted 
measures of competition and opacity. This approach effectively controls for state-quarter 
fixed effects, which helps to identify systematic differences in competition and opacity (see 
Clement, 1999). We report our findings in Table 10. The results support our main finding that 
market power (competition) decreases (increases) bank opacity.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Finally, we acknowledge the concern that the Lerner index, which measures bank market 
power, may not capture competition at the banking market level. To address this concern, we 
obtain an aggregate banking market-level measure of competition by taking the average of 
the Lerner index across banks for each state-quarter (e.g., Hainz et al., 2013; Calderon and 
Schaeck, 2016). We report the findings in Table 11. The coefficient on the mean Lerner index 
remains negative and statistically significant across all models. Overall, the results are 
consistent with our main finding that competition increases bank opacity.  
 [Insert Table 11 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
Bank opacity remains a key element in regulatory framework, especially in the wave of 
banking system deregulation. In particular, the 2007-09 financial crisis has partly been 
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attributed to poor practices relating to lack of disclosure, transparency and fair 
competition within the global banking system. This has resulted in a considerable 
amount of reforms relating to disclosure, transparency and competition in the banking 
sector. In this case, the comprehensive Basel III accord is at the apex of such efforts. For 
example, Basel III requires enhanced disclosures with respect to the details of the 
components of regulatory capital and their reconciliation to the reported accounts, 
including transparency on how banks calculate their regulatory capital ratios. Such 
comprehensive banking reforms have also appealed to a renewed empirical interest in the 
nexus between bank opacity and several banking market outcomes, such as risk-taking 
and performance, with little attention paid to banking competition. In fact, the existing 
empirical literature focuses mainly on analysing deregulatory and textual-analysis measures 
of competition on accounting measures of opacity.  
We, therefore, have departed from much of the existing literature by utilising the traditional 
competition measure (the Lerner index) and a market-based measure of opacity to provide 
robust first-hand evidence that banking market competition increases analysts’ forecast error, 
dispersion and score. Our findings, thus, show that banking market competition (market 
power) increases (decreases) bank opacity. This finding is consistent with Bushman et al. 
(2016) who show that greater competition is associated with higher bank risks and less timely 
loan loss recognitions. However, our finding is at odds with that of Jiang et al. (2016) who 
find increased levels of competition through deregulation to be associated with quality bank 
reporting (i.e., low bank opacity). Further, we show that the effect of banking market 
competition on opacity persists over time but is more pronounced during crisis. This 
finding is novel in the competition-opacity literature. All our results are robust to 
controlling for traditional analyst characteristics, such as experience and scope, and to 
alternative estimation approaches. 
The findings from this study do not only deepen our understanding of the relationships 
between competition and opacity, but they also provide salient policy implications for the 
Basel III policy initiatives emphasising the need for transparency and market discipline. For 
instance, as market discipline (emphasised in Basel III) encompasses the ability of financial 
markets and regulators to penalise banks for excessive risk-taking, transparency across the 
full operations of banks is essential. This drives home Basel III’s call for uniform and full 
disclosure of capital base and liquidity ratios, especially for countries with more competitive 
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banking markets. In other words, the clarity offered by Basel III for the definitions of Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital, as well as the total exposure of banks used in computing leverage ratios, 
could reduce room for abuse, enhance transparency and consequently reduce opacity that 
often plagues banks in competitive markets. For the Basel III disclosure and transparency 
accord to be effective, however, the development, implementation and enforcement of a 
uniform standard of reporting and disclosure framework akin to the international financial 
reporting standards framework by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will be 
crucial. 
Notwithstanding the importance and robustness of our findings, it is useful to acknowledge 
the limitations of our paper. For example, similar to all archival-based studies of this nature, 
our proxies for opacity, competition and bank attributes may or may not reflect practice. In 
this case, future research may be able to offer further insights by conducting in-depth 
interviews with analysts, bankers, policymakers and regulators. Similarly, our study focuses 
on US banks; future studies may be able to enrich our findings by extending our analysis 
using a sample of banks from a number of countries, comprising both developed and 
developing countries. Also, as more data becomes available, future studies can extend our 
analysis by using greater post-2007-09 financial crisis period datasets.  
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Table 1: Description of variables 
  
Variable Description 
 
Dependent variables  
Forecast error Measure of opacity, measured as the absolute value of the difference between 
mean analysts’ forecasts and actual earnings per share scaled by the share price 
at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. 
 
Forecast dispersion Alternative measure of opacity, measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts for the fiscal quarter scaled by the share price at the beginning of the 
fiscal quarter. 
 
Opacity score Opacity index measured as the sum of the normalised values of analysts’ 
forecast errors and forecast. 
 
Independent variables  
Lerner Lerner index, a measure of competition at the bank level derived from Eq. 3. A 
higher value of the index indicates lower competition. 
 
Size Bank size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Loans The ratio of bank loans to total assets.  
 
Capital The ratio of book value of equity to total assets.  
 
Surprise Earnings surprise, defined as the absolute value of the difference between 
current earnings per share and the prior quarter earnings per share deflated by 
stock price at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. 
 
Provisions The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. 
 
Volatility Standard deviation of return on equity. 
 
Analysts The number of analysts following. 
 
Non-interest The ratio of non-interest income to total income. 
  
Deposits The ratio of core deposits to total liabilities. 
 
Experience General experience: the log of one plus the total days since the analyst first 
issued a forecast for any bank they are following. 
 
Length Firm-specific experience: the log of one plus average number of days since the 
analysts covering a bank first issued a forecast for the bank.  
 
Scope Scope of coverage: the log of one plus the average number of banks covered by 
the analysts following a bank in the fiscal quarter. 
The table presents the mnemonics and description of each dependent and independent variable used in this paper. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
      
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Absolute forecast error 0.44 0.90 0.00 3.75 18632.00 
Forecast dispersion 0.20 0.38 0.00 1.57 15255.00 
Opacity score 0.26 0.46 0.00 2.00 15255.00 
Lerner 0.64 0.16 0.35 0.87 18632.00 
Size 15.55 1.47 13.45 18.70 18632.00 
Loans 0.87 0.15 0.56 1.16 18631.00 
Capital 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.14 18632.00 
Surprise 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 17502.00 
Provisions 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 18631.00 
Volatility 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.12 18338.00 
Analysts 6.33 6.22 1.00 39.00 18632.00 
Non-interest 0.80 0.10 0.54 0.94 18632.00 
Deposits 0.67 0.14 0.32 0.87 18065.00 
Experience 7.60 0.87 0.00 9.22 18632.00 
Length 6.28 1.54 0.00 8.71 18632.00 
Scope 2.77 0.34 0.69 4.93 18632.00 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. The sample comprises 610 US bank holding companies over 
the period 1986-2015. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Correlations matrix 
                 
 Error Dispersion score Lerner Size Loans Capital Surprise Provisions Volatility Analysts Non-
interes
t 
Deposits Experience Length Scope 
Forecast error 1.00                
Forecast 
dispersion 
0.77* 1.00               
Opacity score 0.93* 0.93* 1.00              
Lerner -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* 1.00             
Size -0.06* -0.01 -0.02* 0.09* 1.00            
Loans 0.09* 0.12* 0.10* 0.01 0.08* 1.00           
Capital -0.07* -0.04* -0.07* 0.13* -0.09* 0.08* 1.00          
Surprise 0.66* 0.72* 0.72* -0.05* -0.03* 0.09* -0.07* 1.00         
Provisions 0.28* 0.31* 0.33* 0.02 0.22* -0.17* -0.10* 0.32* 1.00        
Volatility 0.52* 0.51* 0.54* -0.02 0.06* 0.10* -0.14* 0.55* 0.25* 1.00       
Analysts -0.06* 0.01 -0.02 0.11* 0.81* 0.11* 0.09* -0.03* 0.17* 0.03* 1.00      
Non-interest 0.10* 0.07* 0.09* -0.12* -0.48* 0.11* -0.13* 0.07* -0.05* 0.01 -0.49* 1.00     
Deposits -0.07* -0.09* -0.08* 0.03* -0.38* -0.30* 0.21* -0.08* -0.02* -0.15* -0.29* 0.25* 1.00    
Experience 0.01 0.05* 0.04* 0.08* 0.23* 0.07* 0.19* 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.30* -0.22* -0.06* 1.00   
Length 0.03* 0.07* 0.05* 0.08* 0.38* 0.03* 0.08* 0.04* 0.12* 0.04* 0.39* -0.26* -0.10* 0.53* 1.00  
Scope -0.04* -0.04* -0.02* -0.01 0.08* -0.02 -0.02* -0.04* 0.06* -0.04* 0.06* -0.01 0.07* 0.25* 0.18* 1.00 
The table presents the unconditional correlation coefficient between any pair of variables. All variables are as described in Table 1. * indicates significance at 5%. 
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Table 4: Banking competition and bank opacity – analysts' forecast error 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Lerner -2.181*** -1.102*** -1.090*** -1.091*** -1.051*** -1.592*** -1.021*** -0.863*** -1.068*** -0.904*** 
 (0.492) (0.264) (0.258) (0.274) (0.266) (0.343) (0.253) (0.238) (0.254) (0.236) 
Size  -0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.005  0.078*** 0.053* 0.088*** 0.062** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Loans  0.266*** 0.220*** 0.269*** 0.211***  0.282*** 0.251*** 0.344*** 0.312*** 
  (0.057) (0.062) (0.056) (0.060)  (0.091) (0.090) (0.102) (0.101) 
Capital  -2.068*** -2.004*** -2.117*** -1.996***  -3.240*** -3.017*** -3.433*** -3.232*** 
  (0.553) (0.546) (0.601) (0.590)  (0.717) (0.711) (0.733) (0.726) 
Surprise  22.640*** 22.545*** 22.909*** 22.810***  12.415*** 12.415*** 12.611*** 12.625*** 
  (1.643) (1.683) (1.644) (1.677)  (1.056) (1.050) (1.049) (1.044) 
Provisions  13.377*** 12.979*** 13.520*** 13.090***  16.468*** 15.755*** 16.495*** 15.796*** 
  (2.134) (2.092) (2.201) (2.163)  (2.254) (2.207) (2.309) (2.275) 
Volatility  5.795*** 5.860*** 5.817*** 5.873***  6.356*** 6.449*** 6.387*** 6.478*** 
  (0.591) (0.594) (0.604) (0.606)  (0.465) (0.469) (0.474) (0.476) 
Analysts  -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.007**  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-interest   0.377***  0.402***   0.828***  0.830*** 
   (0.127)  (0.127)   (0.237)  (0.215) 
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Deposits    0.009 -0.046    0.243* 0.234* 
    (0.095) (0.094)    (0.140) (0.140) 
Constant 1.332*** 1.416*** 0.932** 1.311*** 0.860** 1.253*** -0.610 -0.891** -0.983** -1.249*** 
 (0.247) (0.364) (0.368) (0.343) (0.355) (0.238) (0.448) (0.442) (0.482) (0.482) 
Observations 17321 16215 16215 15745 15745 17321 16215 16215 15745 15745 
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.521 0.522 0.527 0.529 0.237 0.399 0.401 0.406 0.408 
Number of banks 596 592 592 590 590 596 592 592 590 590 
This table presents the OLS and fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast error. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include 
bank fixed-effects. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions 
are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5: Banking competition and bank opacity – analysts' forecast dispersion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Lerner -0.661*** -0.410*** -0.407*** -0.405*** -0.392*** -0.661*** -0.414*** -0.357*** -0.424*** -0.366*** 
 (0.218) (0.105) (0.104) (0.108) (0.106) (0.123) (0.085) (0.091) (0.085) (0.088) 
Size  0.006 0.010 0.006 0.009  0.025** 0.015 0.026** 0.017 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Loans  0.126*** 0.109*** 0.124*** 0.104***  0.078** 0.068* 0.087** 0.076* 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)  (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) 
Capital  -0.724*** -0.701*** -0.755*** -0.712***  -0.835*** -0.752** -0.858*** -0.792** 
  (0.235) (0.233) (0.252) (0.248)  (0.305) (0.306) (0.314) (0.314) 
Surprise  11.156*** 11.122*** 11.232*** 11.198***  7.020*** 7.021*** 7.042*** 7.048*** 
  (0.636) (0.644) (0.639) (0.644)  (0.399) (0.396) (0.402) (0.400) 
Provisions  6.262*** 6.109*** 6.096*** 5.935***  7.950*** 7.661*** 7.848*** 7.576*** 
  (0.911) (0.904) (0.928) (0.922)  (0.905) (0.895) (0.892) (0.889) 
Volatility  1.680*** 1.705*** 1.695*** 1.715***  1.830*** 1.864*** 1.838*** 1.870*** 
  (0.231) (0.231) (0.237) (0.236)  (0.176) (0.178) (0.179) (0.181) 
Analysts  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest   0.129***  0.133**   0.308**  0.297*** 
   (0.050)  (0.054)   (0.120)  (0.100) 
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Deposits    0.004 -0.015    0.037 0.036 
    (0.041) (0.042)    (0.065) (0.064) 
Constant 0.417*** 0.030 -0.138 0.396** 0.245 0.545*** -0.167 -0.265 -0.221 -0.311 
 (0.092) (0.119) (0.133) (0.162) (0.168) (0.086) (0.198) (0.208) (0.238) (0.249) 
Observations 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.589 0.590 0.592 0.593 0.301 0.488 0.490 0.491 0.493 
Number of banks 519 511 511 508 508 519 511 511 508 508 
This table presents the OLS and fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast dispersion. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 
include bank fixed effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable 
definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6: Banking competition and bank opacity – opacity score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Lerner -0.993*** -0.608*** -0.604*** -0.586*** -0.568*** -0.821*** -0.548*** -0.475*** -0.556*** -0.481*** 
 (0.285) (0.139) (0.136) (0.142) (0.138) (0.162) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) (0.106) 
Size  0.003 0.009 0.001 0.006  0.030** 0.018 0.032** 0.020 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Loans  0.148*** 0.125*** 0.141*** 0.113***  0.100** 0.087* 0.110** 0.097* 
  (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)  (0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (0.052) 
Capital  -1.016*** -0.987*** -1.025*** -0.966***  -1.137*** -1.033*** -1.165*** -1.078*** 
  (0.308) (0.304) (0.331) (0.324)  (0.375) (0.375) (0.385) (0.385) 
Surprise  13.006*** 12.961*** 13.168*** 13.121***  7.479*** 7.481*** 7.607*** 7.616*** 
  (0.826) (0.838) (0.818) (0.828)  (0.516) (0.513) (0.507) (0.506) 
Provisions  8.788*** 8.589*** 8.529*** 8.306***  9.807*** 9.441*** 9.675*** 9.320*** 
  (1.172) (1.161) (1.187) (1.174)  (1.089) (1.066) (1.085) (1.068) 
Volatility  2.773*** 2.806*** 2.761*** 2.789***  2.976*** 3.019*** 2.963*** 3.004*** 
  (0.298) (0.298) (0.303) (0.303)  (0.228) (0.230) (0.230) (0.231) 
Analysts  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest   0.168**  0.184***   0.389***  0.388*** 
   (0.065)  (0.070)   (0.136)  (0.117) 
Deposits    -0.016 -0.044    0.040 0.039 
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    (0.056) (0.056)    (0.079) (0.078) 
Constant 0.521*** 0.095 -0.124 0.637*** 0.428** 0.663*** -0.170 -0.294 -0.246 -0.364 
 (0.109) (0.152) (0.168) (0.199) (0.207) (0.113) (0.220) (0.223) (0.247) (0.255) 
Observations 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.597 0.598 0.602 0.603 0.292 0.493 0.494 0.499 0.501 
Number of banks 519 511 511 508 508 519 511 511 508 508 
This table presents the OLS and fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on opacity score. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include bank fixed 
effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as 
described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 7: Banking competition and bank opacity – two-stage least square 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Forecast error  Forecast dispersion  Opacity score 
 First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage 
Dependent variable Lerner Forecast error  Lerner Forecast 
dispersion 
 Lerner Forecast score 
Inefficiencyt-1 -0.863***   -0.857***   -0.857***  
 (0.048)   (0.053)   (0.053)  
Lernert-2 0.079***   0.085***   0.085***  
 (0.025)   (0.027)   (0.027)  
Lerner  -1.135***   -0.402***   -0.573*** 
  (0.266)   (0.099)   (0.121) 
Size 0.013*** 0.064**  0.014*** 0.017  0.014*** 0.020 
 (0.002) (0.028)  (0.002) (0.013)  (0.002) (0.015) 
Loans 0.014** 0.326***  0.015** 0.076*  0.015** 0.100* 
 (0.007) (0.102)  (0.007) (0.042)  (0.007) (0.052) 
Capital -0.030 -3.161***  -0.029 -0.772**  -0.029 -1.046*** 
 (0.025) (0.727)  (0.027) (0.314)  (0.027) (0.384) 
Surprise 0.002 12.549***  0.002 7.029***  0.002 7.587*** 
 (0.011) (1.043)  (0.013) (0.398)  (0.013) (0.504) 
Provisions -0.033 15.938***  -0.052 7.610***  -0.052 9.388*** 
 (0.053) (2.315)  (0.058) (0.901)  (0.058) (1.087) 
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Volatility 0.006 6.478***  0.008 1.873***  0.008 3.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.475)  (0.005) (0.180)  (0.005) (0.230) 
Analysts -0.000** -0.003  -0.000** 0.001  -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Non-interest -0.013 0.821***  -0.014 0.298***  -0.014 0.384*** 
 (0.013) (0.215)  (0.014) (0.100)  (0.014) (0.117) 
Deposits 0.008 0.277**  0.009 0.043  0.009 0.057 
 (0.008) (0.137)  (0.008) (0.065)  (0.008) (0.078) 
Observations 15599 15599  13487 13487  13487 13487 
Adjusted R2  0.385   0.473   0.482 
Number of banks 551 551  477 477  477 477 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat.  374.527   305.438   305.438 
Hansen J p-value  0.605   0.161   0.353 
This table presents the two-stage estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast error, forecast dispersion and opacity score. Models 1, 3 and 5 present the results of the first-
stage regressions, whilst Models 2, 4 and 6 present the results of the corresponding second-stage regressions. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. Inefficiency is the ratio of overheads to income. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8: Banking competition and bank opacity – Controlling for analysts' characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent 
variable 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Opacity 
score 
Opacity 
score 
Opacity 
score 
Opacity 
score 
Lerner -0.898*** -0.904*** -0.906*** -0.898*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.365*** -0.481*** -0.481*** -0.481*** -0.480*** 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.236) (0.235) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Size 0.065** 0.061** 0.064** 0.062** 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.019 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Loans 0.315*** 0.311*** 0.316*** 0.312*** 0.078* 0.077* 0.077* 0.077* 0.098* 0.097* 0.098* 0.097* 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Capital -3.248*** -3.221*** -3.223*** -3.203*** -0.801** -0.792** -0.792** -0.794** -1.091*** -1.077*** -1.078*** -1.078*** 
 (0.727) (0.725) (0.725) (0.724) (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.386) (0.385) (0.385) (0.385) 
Surprise 12.631*** 12.614*** 12.633*** 12.600*** 7.052*** 7.049*** 7.050*** 7.045*** 7.620*** 7.615*** 7.620*** 7.612*** 
 (1.045) (1.044) (1.044) (1.044) (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.505) (0.505) (0.505) (0.505) 
Provisions 15.905*** 15.761*** 15.781*** 15.788*** 7.609*** 7.577*** 7.573*** 7.595*** 9.366*** 9.317*** 9.309*** 9.331*** 
 (2.272) (2.274) (2.276) (2.271) (0.888) (0.889) (0.889) (0.888) (1.065) (1.066) (1.068) (1.065) 
Volatility 6.472*** 6.478*** 6.462*** 6.460*** 1.867*** 1.870*** 1.869*** 1.868*** 3.000*** 3.004*** 3.000*** 2.998*** 
 (0.476) (0.476) (0.475) (0.474) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.180) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) 
Analysts -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.819*** 0.831*** 0.838*** 0.823*** 0.293*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.292*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 0.389*** 0.382*** 
 (0.214) (0.215) (0.214) (0.214) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Deposits 0.223 0.236* 0.239* 0.234* 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.040 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
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Experience -0.029***   -0.035*** -0.010***   -0.013*** -0.014***   -0.018*** 
 (0.009)   (0.009) (0.004)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) 
Length  0.004  0.014***  -0.000  0.003  0.000  0.005* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Scope   -0.050** -0.035   -0.003 0.003   -0.011 -0.003 
   (0.022) (0.023)   (0.008) (0.009)   (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant -1.047** -1.257*** -1.147** -0.962** -0.236 -0.311 -0.304 -0.227 -0.257 -0.364 -0.341 -0.234 
 (0.491) (0.483) (0.486) (0.488) (0.251) (0.249) (0.250) (0.252) (0.259) (0.255) (0.256) (0.258) 
Observations 15745 15745 15745 15745 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.501 0.500 0.501 0.501 
Number of banks 590 590 590 590 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast error, forecast dispersion and opacity score. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, 
whilst Models 6-10 include bank fixed effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The 
sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9: Banking competition and bank opacity – Crisis subsamples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Forecast error Forecast error Forecast error Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Opacity score Opacity score Opacity score 
Lerner -1.534*** -0.496** -0.854*** -0.467*** -0.268*** -0.288** -0.686*** -0.315*** -0.393*** 
 (0.350) (0.200) (0.311) (0.127) (0.090) (0.131) (0.152) (0.096) (0.139) 
Size 0.059** 0.057** 0.056** 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Loans 0.299*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 0.074* 0.068 0.068 0.091* 0.082 0.081 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Capital -3.172*** -3.184*** -3.171*** -0.794** -0.799** -0.799** -1.079*** -1.087*** -1.087*** 
 (0.710) (0.709) (0.704) (0.313) (0.312) (0.312) (0.381) (0.380) (0.379) 
Surprise 12.465*** 12.315*** 12.288*** 7.025*** 6.981*** 6.979*** 7.571*** 7.503*** 7.497*** 
 (1.046) (1.041) (1.043) (0.397) (0.398) (0.398) (0.503) (0.502) (0.501) 
Provisions 15.399*** 15.958*** 15.749*** 7.539*** 7.647*** 7.637*** 9.218*** 9.420*** 9.378*** 
 (2.248) (2.231) (2.219) (0.883) (0.881) (0.880) (1.060) (1.049) (1.050) 
Volatility 6.442*** 6.438*** 6.433*** 1.863*** 1.862*** 1.861*** 2.989*** 2.988*** 2.986*** 
 (0.471) (0.469) (0.468) (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.230) (0.229) (0.229) 
Analysts -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.830*** 0.774*** 0.784*** 0.295*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 0.387*** 0.365*** 0.368*** 
 (0.212) (0.213) (0.212) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
Deposits 0.222 0.197 0.196 0.033 0.027 0.027 0.034 0.026 0.025 
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 (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
Experience -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Length 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005* 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Scope -0.032 -0.035 -0.034 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lerner x Pre-crisis 1.392***  0.666* 0.230  0.037 0.464**  0.151 
 (0.383)  (0.363) (0.152)  (0.145) (0.187)  (0.173) 
Pre-crisis -1.000***  -0.540** -0.238**  -0.116 -0.387***  -0.187* 
 (0.255)  (0.239) (0.096)  (0.093) (0.118)  (0.109) 
Lerner x crisis  -2.451*** -2.128***  -0.588** -0.570**  -1.001*** -0.929*** 
  (0.602) (0.606)  (0.253) (0.261)  (0.313) (0.315) 
Crisis  1.504*** 1.291***  0.426*** 0.414***  0.665*** 0.618*** 
  (0.297) (0.309)  (0.131) (0.140)  (0.159) (0.163) 
Constant -0.496 -1.053** -0.818 -0.148 -0.247 -0.234 -0.076 -0.268 -0.215 
 (0.519) (0.485) (0.512) (0.260) (0.256) (0.267) (0.270) (0.262) (0.273) 
Observations 15745 15745 15745 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.412 0.412 0.493 0.494 0.494 0.502 0.503 0.503 
Number of banks 590 590 590 508 508 508 508 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast error, forecast dispersion and opacity score. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include bank fixed effect. Time dummies are 
included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 10: Banking competition and bank opacity – addressing state-quarter fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AFE FDISP Score 
Lerner -1.126*** -0.369*** -0.528*** 
 (0.268) (0.088) (0.119) 
Size 0.048 0.015 0.020 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.018) 
Loans 0.163 0.030 0.033 
 (0.105) (0.046) (0.061) 
Capital -1.900*** -0.550* -0.681* 
 (0.730) (0.330) (0.406) 
Surprise 8.333*** 4.663*** 5.062*** 
 (0.909) (0.341) (0.441) 
Provisions 5.651** 2.458*** 2.774** 
 (2.244) (0.852) (1.115) 
Volatility 4.391*** 1.081*** 1.884*** 
 (0.414) (0.145) (0.189) 
Analysts -0.006** -0.002* -0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.800*** 0.313*** 0.419*** 
 (0.183) (0.073) (0.088) 
Deposits 0.150 -0.042 -0.036 
 (0.160) (0.076) (0.095) 
Constant -1.533*** -0.454* -0.624** 
 (0.558) (0.263) (0.317) 
Observations 15748 13601 13601 
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.147 0.162 
Number of banks 590 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effect estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast error, forecast 
dispersion and opacity score. Lerner index and opacity are state-quarter mean-adjusted in all models. Standard error 
robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within bank are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as 
described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 11: Banking competition and bank opacity – using a measure of competition at the banking market level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AFE FDISP SCORE 
Lerner -0.887*** -0.450** -0.513*** 
 (0.332) (0.176) (0.184) 
Size 0.044 0.009 0.010 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.014) 
Loans 0.282*** 0.066 0.082 
 (0.101) (0.042) (0.052) 
Capital -3.387*** -0.850*** -1.159*** 
 (0.715) (0.312) (0.380) 
Surprise 12.705*** 7.074*** 7.653*** 
 (1.044) (0.400) (0.504) 
Provisions 15.920*** 7.618*** 9.386*** 
 (2.286) (0.892) (1.069) 
Volatility 6.480*** 1.867*** 3.000*** 
 (0.478) (0.181) (0.232) 
Analysts -0.002 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.928*** 0.332*** 0.438*** 
 (0.219) (0.099) (0.119) 
Deposits 0.184 0.018 0.013 
 (0.139) (0.065) (0.078) 
Constant -0.960* -0.134 -0.178 
 (0.527) (0.287) (0.289) 
Observations 15745 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.492 0.499 
Number of banks 590 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on analysts’ forecast error, forecast dispersion and 
opacity score. Lerner index is measured at the state level for each year-quarter in all models. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity 
and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Highlights 
 We derive a measure of bank opacity from analysts’ forecast properties. 
 We investigate the impact of banking competition on the opacity of US bank 
holding companies. 
 Banking competition increases bank opacity and the effect persists over time. 
 Our findings have important policy implications for the Basel III policy initiatives. 
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